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“Account Me Man”: Economic Incarnation and Common Wealth in Paradise Lost1
Thomas Lay
tlay@sas.upenn.edu,
tlay80@gmail.com
“The monetary system is essentially a Catholic institution, the credit system essentially
Protestant. ‘The Scotch hate gold.’ In the form of paper the monetary existence of commodities
is only a social one. It is Faith that brings salvation.” So wrote Marx in the third volume of
Capital.2 John Parker has argued that Marx’s observation is more than a bon mot that extends
base into superstructure; it is part of a “Christological theory of value” whose terms Marx
derived from the theology of the Incarnation.3 To Parker, Marx’s appropriation of theology was
not a radical perversion of Christianity. For centuries, he argues, Christianity told an economic
narrative: the story of a people bound to its landlord for a debt incurred in the theft of an apple, a
debt that might only be redeemed – paid for, that is – by Christ’s body.4 To put it that way
sounds perverse to us, but Parker suggests that our resistance is the legacy of Early Modern
Protestantism – of what Peter Stallybrass, writing in Parker’s wake, describes as a Protestant
“attempt to drive the economics out of belief” by “separating out ... what is brought together in
the Latin credere (to believe, to trust, to put credit in).”5
This line of Protestant antimaterialism will be familiar to anyone acquainted with
1

This paper is the product of two seminars, one with Stuart Curran, and the other with Peter Stallybrass. Without
their insights and guidance, both in and out of the classroom, I could not have written it. In addition, Michael
Gamer, tireless as ever in his support of undergraduates, generously offered to read a partial draft, and his
suggestions were crucial in helping me past some early stumbles. To all three, I owe a “debt immense of endless
gratitude.”
2
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. New York: International Publishers. Vol. 37 p. 587.
3
John Parker, God Among Thieves: Marx’s Christological Theory of Value and the Literature of the English
Reformation. Diss U Pennsylvania, 1999. Ann Arbor: UMI, 1999. UMI Number 993777. See especially pp. 31-7,
67-70, and 77-88. Parker cites the passage on p. 77.
4
This is the language of atonement and satisfaction, particularly in its elaboration by St. Anselm (1033-1109) in
Cur Deus Homo (available in Anselm of Canterbury, ed. and tr., Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, Toronto
and New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1976, vol. 3, pp. 39-137.) For Parker’s discussion of Anselm’s influence
through Luther, see pp. 90-96.
5
Peter Stallybrass, “The Value of Culture and the Disavowal of Things.” The Culture of Capital: Properties,
Cities, and Knowledge in Early Modern England, ed., Henry S. Turner, New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 282. See
also Stallybrass’s delightfully contrarian account of Christianity as “An Economic Story” in that essay, pp. 279-80.
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countless attacks on Catholics for the idolatry of saint-veneration and the perverse grotesquerie
of the doctrine of transubstantiation. It also characterized attacks on Jews for usury. In
Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice for instance, the cold hard cash of Shylock’s dreams of
moneybags and reported cries for his daughter and his ducats are opposed by the transcendence
of Portia’s “quality of mercy.”6 But as Parker has shown, the usury by which Luther castigated
Jews is but a suppressed meaning of the very Latin word – credere – by which he claimed
salvation by faith alone (Parker 126). Moreover, the economics of belief, still perilously latent in
Luther’s credit could be eradicated in translation, for, as Parker notes (147-50), Archbishop
Cranmer did just that in 1549 to the central text of the new Anglican Book of Common Prayer.
The officially sanctioned “Great Bible,” with a preface by Cranmer himself, had joined every
Early Modern English bible but one in rendering the Lord’s Prayer’s fifth petition “forgeve us
our dettes, as we forgeve oure detters.”7 The single exception was William Tyndale’s bible of
1534, which inaccurately translated the Greek “opheilemata” (“debita” in the Vulgate) as
“trespasses” rather than “debts.” But Tyndale was a radical Lutheran. His translation had been
banned, and in 1536, he had been burned as a heretic in Belgium at the instigation of the Tudor
government Cranmer already served. Nevertheless, a decade later, in the new prayer-book’s
central text Cranmer followed a heretical, inaccurate, solitary exception, and as a result, most
English-speakers since have learned the Lord’s Prayer’s fifth petition with its economic
metaphor erased: “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us.”
Parker’s study ends at the outbreak of civil war, his narrative of Protestant and Catholic
self-differentiation now complicated by political changes and left “hanging ... like a skeleton, a
6

Quotations from Shakespeare are from The Norton Shakespeare, ed., Stephen Greenblatt, et al. New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1997. The quotations are from 2.5.17, 2.8.15-24, and 4.1.179.
7
The Byble in Englyshe that is to saye the conte[n]t of al the holy scrypture, both of ye olde, and newe
testame[n]t, with a prologe therinto, made by the reuerende father in God, Thomas archbysshop of Cantorbury...
London, 1540, Matthew 6:12. Accessed via Early English Books Online.
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contradictory, hybrid, intricate genealogy” (208). This essay, then, proposes to examine that
skeleton’s curious resurrection – one that promised salvation in familiar terms, but now with
radically new meanings. As the work of a mid seventeenth-century Protestant, Paradise Lost
defies the expectations of a century’s debate by its pervasive and explicitly materialist theology
of debt. In considering the poem, I hope to suggest a way to extend Parker’s research past 1642
by examining how the older terms of religious debate were reformulated with radical
implications not only for theology but for politics. It will help to begin, however, with the
political implications already implicit in the erasure of the economics of belief at the century’s
turn.

i: Invisible Usury, Invisible Kings
The subordination of the rhetoric of commerce had played out, of course, in a culture of
proliferating commerce. Part of what makes The Merchant of Venice so complex is that its
condemnation of usury transpires in the most commercial of cities and that Portia’s call for
mercy is on behalf of a merchant who expects from his investments “return / Of thrice three
times the value of [the] bond” 8 (1.3.154-5). The play itself was performed in a commercial
theater that turned familiar stories into profits, its primary capital – clothing – dependent on a
system of pawnbroking usurious in all but name.9 For even as usury made a convenient
scapegoat, commerce needed it to thrive: thus, the 1571 act that legalized usury at rates up to ten
percent positioned itself as “An Act Against Usury,” with a stated aim of lessening the
exploitative possibilities of an illegal vice by making it legal. John Wooley spoke cautiously in

8

Admittedly, it is not from this bond that Antonio makes his profits, but it is clear from the risk involved that he
stands to profit considerably should his ships return, even if nobody is thoughtless enough to state the point directly.
9
See chapter seven of Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of
Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, esp., p. 181-4.
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the act’s support, arguing that usury’s “mischief is of the excess, and not otherwise, since to take
reasonable, or so that both parties might do good, was not hateful.”10 The latter contingency “that both parties might do good” - was consistently the grounds on which usury might find
support.11 But in The Merchant of Venice, mutual benefit is not the grounds for the primary debt,
by which neither Shylock nor Antonio stands to profit. Initially, it is supposed to form the basis
for Antonio’s secondary loan to Bassanio, which Bassanio urges as a means to win a rich lady
and pay back prior debts to Antonio (1.1.146-52). But the matter having been raised once
subsequently disappears: we hear no more of literal profit to Antonio, and Bassanio’s ambitions
for a “lady richly left” (1.1.161) are, even in their very actualization, apparently transformed by
his disavowal of gold and silver caskets for lead. It is only in a bizarrely refigured context that
the language of mutual benefit returns: it returns in the “quality of mercy” that “blesseth him
that gives and him that takes” (4.1.181-2). In Portia’s speech, mercy is as profitable as usury, but
as if by magic, it is sealed off against sully in the marketplace where it might actually make that
profit. For mercy to be above the marketplace, it has to be a part of of a social hierarchy. Portia,
herself a representative of the upper echelons of that hierarchy (and yet by her gender usually
doubly secluded from the marketplace), argues that mercy defines the height of earthly power
such that fealty at society’s apex to God’s mercy implies society’s fealty to that apex:
‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest. It becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown.
His scepter shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
10

A truncated text of the act and of Wooley’s speech, together with other primary materials on usury, may be
found in Jay L. Halio, ed., Understanding The Merchant of Venice: a Student Casebook to Issues, Sources and
Historical Documents. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000, pp. 115-37. The Wooley quotation is on p. 125.
11
Noted by David Hawkes in Idols of the Marketplace: Idolatry and Commodity Fetishism in English Literature,
1580-1680. New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 105. The condition of mutual benefit was also the grounds on which
Milton supported the practice. See De Doctrina Christiana, Book II, pp. 336-43, in The Works of John Milton, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1934, vol. 17. See also the entry in Milton’s commonplace book, in John Milton,
Complete Prose Works. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1953, (hereinafter, CPW), vol. 1, pp. 418-9.
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But mercy is above this sceptered sway.
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings;
It is an attribute to God himself,
And earthly power doth then show likest God’s
When mercy seasons justice. (4.1.183-92)
With usury reduced to a rhetorical residue, the passage erases the economics of belief in a
mystified language of “majesty,” and to ground the mystification, it performs a second evasion:
it appeals to kings in a Republic ruled by an elected duke who at that very moment presides on
stage before Portia; it invokes monarchy in the visible absence of a monarch.
Shakespeare does, of course, celebrate some of the finer aspects of the emerging
economy in which he participates, both in The Merchant of Venice and elsewhere. Doing so,
however, usually involves purging commerce of the dirty means by which it thrives and
subordinating it both to religion and to earthly power, and especially kings, whether or not they
exist. Thus Henry V must reject the commercial world of the tavern to be transformed into “the
mirror of all Christian Kings,” “the offending Adam” “whipped … out of him” (1.1.30, 2.0.6).
In the same play, the plundering of churches by Henry’s companions is an unpardonable sin, as
is the traitors’ plot to “coin [him] into gold” (2.2.95). Although the company was coining Henry
into gold before its audience’s eyes, it could do so because the play’s rhetoric had condemned
the offense. Indeed, the company acted, at least in a legal fiction, in service to the royal
household as the Lord Chamberlain’s, later, King’s Men. Shakespeare’s Kings are at their best
when, as in All’s Well That Ends Well, they bless the doctor’s daughters of the emerging
commercial economy for service provided not in mercantile exchange but through bizarre rituals,
negotiated in rhymed verse, involving folk-like plots of miraculous cures for strange diseases –
the punishment for failure not bad word of mouth but death, the reward for success not
remuneration but marriage, and the real agent not the enterprising young woman herself but “the
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very hand of heaven” (2.3.29-30, 61) in disproof of fools who “say miracles are past” (2.3.1). It
is a convenient arrangement by which kings may give the appearance of incorporating the best
aspects of a crucial new class without having to lower themselves to the vulgarity of commerce.
To reformulate Greenblatt’s invocation of Kafka, there is a marketplace, no end to a
marketplace, only not for anyone who matters.12
What I would like to suggest then is that the suppression of the economic basis of
Christianity not only defined Protestantism. It also justified social hierarchies and thus defined a
Royalist agenda. In that context, Milton’s explicitly economic theology of Paradise Lost,
inexplicable in terms Protestant ideology, starts to make sense as an assault on the “evil dayes”
into which the nation had, with the 1660 Restoration of Charlies II, fallen.13 But before turning
at last to Milton, one final foray into Shakespeare will be useful.

ii: The Return of the Invisible King; The Fellowship of the Kingless
For us, the word “redeem” is familiar both in its Latin meaning of buying back and in its
Christian meaning (more often expressed in the nouns “redeemer” and “redemption”) of
deliverance from sin, but it rare now to acknowledge that the latter meaning derives from the
former. The distinction seems to have been in place by Milton’s time. Shakespeare uses both
senses of the word and its variant forms forty-eight times but not one instance recalls Christian
redemption as an economic metaphor; rather, on the few occasions where the two senses appear
to converge in pun, the point is to subordinate economic to spiritual redemption.14 The plot of
12

Stephen Greenblatt, “Invisible Bullets: Renaissance authority and its subversion, Henry IV, Henry V,” in
Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism, ed., Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1985, p 47.
13
Quotations from Milton’s poetry are from The Complete Poetry of John Milton, ed., John T. Shawcross. New
York: Anchor Books, 1971.
14
Based on Open Source Shakespeare’s concordance at
<http://www.opensourceshakespeare.com/concordance/>.
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Measure for Measure springs from the deputy Angelo’s proposal that Isabella “redeem”15 her
condemned brother Claudio (2.4.53, 163) by submitting to Angelo’s lust, to which she makes the
opposition between redemption’s temporal and spiritual meanings explicit: “Better it were a
brother died at once / Than that a sister, by redeeming him, / Should die forever” (2.4.107-9).
The opposition continues through a subsequent exchange between Isabella and Claudio, and is
only resolved by the subordination of an exchange economy to fealty. The Duke, disguised as a
monk, promises to “redeem” Claudio, while doing “no stain to [her] own gracious person”
(3.1.199-200). In the Duke’s monastic garb, the promise suggests a subordination of corrupt
dealings to religious piety, but it turns out to be a promise that he cannot as a monk fulfill. It is
only by his return to power in the final scene that he makes good on his promise, emerging from
disguise as a sort of Deus ex machine - or rather, Rex ex machina, for now his title changes.
After having been known only as “the Duke,” he is now five times described as “royal” and
seven times as a “prince,” both epithets newly acquired in the final scene.16 In his new royal
authority, the Duke replaces Angelo’s economy of bribes with one of payment for ill deeds,
which he then converts to one of mercy, thereby acquiring the authority for the surprising final
lines in which he asks Isabella to forgo the convent and marry him. Given his stature and
Isabella’s implicit debt to him, and given her repeated vows of eternal chastity, the proposal is
not far from Angelo’s, but the play sanctions it in a “Royal prince” (5.1.57) and not in a
“precise” (1.3.50) bureaucrat. The difference between the two is that Angelo’s proposal is
sullied by the economic terms of redemption, whereas the Duke’s redemption of Claudio creates

15

The use combines the senses of paying for (OED 1) and freeing (OED 3).
Admittedly, the term “Prince” may be applied to a Duke (OED 2a and 5). “Royal” is less plausible, however:
while the OED does offer definitions that refer generally to sovereigns, the examples given nearly all refer to Kings
and Queens. OED 8c gives “having rank comparable to that of a king,” but the OED’s examples are all consciously
figurative (e.g., “royal merchant”). The point of an alteration in nomenclature at this point in the play, I think,
however plausible that nomenclature may be, is to fudge the matter so as to appear to produce a non-existent king.
16
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an implicit debt in Isabella that, crucially, is not spoken of in the economic terms I am using for
it. It is that implied redemption of debt in marriage that in turn redeems for the audience the
generic promise that the play has hitherto left to an unusual degree in doubt. The audience
members get the resolution they had speculated on when they purchased tickets in hopes of
getting more in enjoyment than they paid in coinage. Meanwhile, the company profits by
denying the idea of profit. Benefit is mutual, not, it seems, by usury, but in a form of redemption
that refuses to acknowledge its basis in debt.17
Consider then, by contrast, the rendering of the Incarnation in Paradise Lost, in the
explicit terms of the redemption of debt. In Book III, God seeks, in advance of the fall, a way to
“renew18 / [man’s] lapsed powers, though forfeit and enthrall’d / By sin to foul exorbitant
desires” (175-7) so that he may “to me owe / All his deliv’rance, and to none but me” (181-2).
Man, it seems, has incurred an unrepayable debt, and in “losing all, / To expiate his treason hath
naught left” (206-7). Man then, must die unless someone else should volunteer to “pay / The
rigid satisfaction,19 death for death” (211-2) and so “redeem Man’s mortal crime” (214-5).
“Without redemption, all mankind” (222) would be damned but for the Son’s “dearest” (226)

17

The only other instance I have found in Shakespeare of redemption’s two senses converging is in Richard III.
In Act I, scene iv, Clarence entreats his hired murderers to forgo what we know to be a contracted murder “as [they]
hope to have redemption / By Christ’s dear blood, shed for our grievous sins” (1.4.177-8). The murder is a matter of
payment; Christ’s redemption is mystified as a matter of sin. Thus monetary redemption precludes spiritual
redemption, and any pun is necessarily oppositional. Forty lines later, when Clarence promises, to great dramatic
irony, that Richard – not Christ – will make the murderers a better offer for mercy (218-9), faith in an exchange
economy is revealed as belief in a demi-devil. One instance between Shakespeare and Milton in which the word
does refer to the economics of belief is George Herbert’s sonnet “Redemption” in The Temple. (George Herbert,
The Complete English Poems, ed., John Tobin. London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 35-6). The sonnet starts by
telling an economic story about a man’s debt to his landlord, only to reveal itself as a story of Christian redemption
by its final couplet, which features another man granting his suit as he dies among “thieves and murderers.” Time
has not permitted a careful study of Herbert or of the word’s history between Shakespeare and Milton, but I wonder
if The Temple didn’t make its point by treating seriously a discourse uncommon by 1633.
18
Italics in this section are mine, and in order to avoid confusion, I have changed to Roman the proper names that
are italicized in Shawcross’s text.
19
The OED cites this instance “satisfaction” under definition 1a: “The payment in full of a debt, or the fulfilment
of an obligation or claim; the atoning for (rarely of) an injury, offence, or fault by reparation, compensation, or the
endurance of punishment.”
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offer. Since mankind, “Indebted and undon, hath none to bring” (235), the Son declares:
Behold mee then, mee for him, life for life
I offer, on me let thine anger fall;
Account mee man; I for his sake will leave
Thy bosom, and this glorie next to thee
Freely put off, and for him lastly die
Well pleas’d, on me let Death wreck all his rage. (236-41)
The bargain is so pleasing to God that the two of them work out a deal whereby God can have
his son and sacrifice him too: “Though now to Death I yield, and am his due,” says the Son, “yet
that debt paid, I shall rise victorious, and subdue20” death itself (245-50) and so “redeem” (260,
281) mankind.
At this point, something new happens. The Incarnation, we discover, is not only
economic, but also egalitarian. God praises the Son in the republican rhetoric of being “found /
By Merit more then Birthright Son of God” (308-9). By praising merit over birthright, God puts
humans on earth without social hierarchies, in fealty only to Heaven:
Here shalt thou sit incarnate, here shalt Reign
Both God and Man, Son, both of God and Man,
Anointed universal King; all Power
I give to thee, reign for ever, and assume
Thy Merits; under thee as Head Supreme
Thrones, Princedoms, Powers, Dominions I reduce:
All knees to thee shall bow. (315-21)
This argument of the Son’s annihilation of earthly kingship by the kingdom of heaven provides
the teleology for Michael’s narrative in Book XII, a narrative of Israel’s history from kingly
enthrallment to liberty through the incarnation and resurrection of the Son as Earth’s only king.
The trajectory starts with Adam’s lament of “Authority usurpt, from God not giv’n” (66), from
which proceeds some of the work’s most boldly anti-Royalist rhetoric:
He gave us onely over Beast, Fish, Fowl
Dominion absolute; that right we hold
20

This instance, unsupported on definitional and etymological grounds, I claim only as a likely pun.
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By his donation; but Man over men
He made not Lord; such title to himself
Reserving, human left from human free. (67-71)
Michael then tells Adam of Israel’s enslavement in Egypt to Pharao and his kingly successor21
(155-222), of the Babylonian captivity (339-49) under kings slightly more amicable but only
because they are so “dispos’d” by God (349), and then of deliverance marred by priests who
seise
The Scepter, and regard not Davids Sons
Then loose it to a stranger, that the true
Anointed King Messiah might be born
Barr’d of his right. (356-60)
In this narrative, Michael does praise a king – David – for “piety” and “puisant deeds” (321-2),
but at the very moment that he tells Adam that David’s “Regal Throne / For ever shall endure”
(323-4), he proclaims kingship’s endurance by means of its earthly abolition:
the like shall sing
All Prophecie, that of the Royal Stock
Of David (so I name this King) shall rise
A Son, the Womans Seed to thee foretold,
Foretold to Abraham, as in whom shall trust
All Nations, and to Kings foretold, of Kings
The last, for of his Reign shall be no end. (324-30)
At the close of Michael’s history, the word redeem returns five times (408, 424, 434, 445, 573),
and now, it takes a specific economic sense: that of paying for someone’s liberation (OED 3) in
“ransom paid, which Man from death redeems, / His [Christ’s] death for Man” (424-5).
Although Milton, perhaps wary of censorship, limits redemption here to ransom from death, he
places it at the climax of a narrative of ransom from kingship. Yet even here, there is a
suggestion that triumph over death entails triumph over kings in Adam’s “Needs must the
Serpent now his capital bruise / Expect” (383-4). Modern editors uniformly gloss “capital” as
21

Fowler notes that Milton names this king Busiris in Book I. (Paradise Lost, ed., Alastair Fowler, Second Ed.
London and New York: Longman, 1998, note to XII, ll. 164-8). In book XII, by contrast, he is known by title
rather than name as “a sequent King” (165), “the lawless Tyrant” (173) and “th’ obdurat King” (205).
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conflating the meanings “mortal” and “on the head,” 22 but the pairing of those two senses in a
pun calls attention to the word itself and suggests the “capital bruise” that had dominated public
consciousness since 1649: the decapitation of a King.
So far, I have not attempted to discuss the economic workings of redemption in Paradise
Lost, but have rather traced its language, as though I were a linguist pursuing an empirical study.
I will delve more throughly into the poem’s economy presently, but first let us pause to consider
the rather schematic opposition I have set up between Milton and Shakespeare and the opposing
ideologies it suggests. Shakespeare – money-lending, malt-hoarding, professional writer who
buys the status of Gentleman – would like to efface the commercialism of his art (and thereby
sell more tickets) and so places the stories he sells in a mystified social hierarchy to convince his
audience of a value beyond price.23 Milton – regicidal advocate for the Commonwealth – would
like to abolish social hierarchies and bind humanity in common to God, and so he conceives of
humanity’s relationship to God in flatly economic terms that leave no place for Kings as God’s
earthly substitutes. But for Milton, that leaves a question: if Shakespeare’s effacement of
commerce serves his own commerce, what economy does an economic Incarnation bring with it
into Milton’s Commonwealth? From our perspective, my comparison would seem to suggest

22

In addition to the Shawcross and Fowler editions already cited, I have checked Stephen Orgel and Jonathan
Goldberg’s Oxford World Classics edition (2004), John Leonard’s Penguin Edition (1998), Scott Elledge’s Norton
Edition (1993), and Roy Flannagan’s edition for Prentice Hall (1993).
23
There are, of course, grounds for complicating this account of Shakespeare, starting, I think, with Timon of
Athens, a play that to me seems utterly bent on deconstructing its own performance. Not only does it feature the
most bizarre revelation of a death in all of Shakespeare (Timon seems to have dug, deposited himself in, and
covered over his own grave, subsequently engraving a first-person account of his death on the tombstone above it,
all of which we learn because a soldier finds the tombstone in the woods, and, being illiterate, makes a wax
impression of it), but it also offers an elaborate demystification of capitalist constructions of value (a subject I have
pursued in another essay). The play was much admired by Marx, who expounded on Timon’s soliloquies about gold
(a “visible god”) in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. See The Marx-Engels Reader, ed., Robert
C. Tucker. New York: Norton, 2nd Edition, 1978, pp. 101-5. Still, one wonders if Timon’s apparent lack of
completion is a consequence of its unpalatability in the commercial theater. For Parker’s account of Shakespearean
drama, which differs somewhat from mine in emphasizing the role of residual religious ceremony in establishing
fetishized value, see “What a Piece of Work is Man: Shakespearean Drama as Marxian Fetish, the Fetish as
Sacremental Sublime,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, Fall 2004, pp. 643-72.

T. Lay, p. 11

that an economic incarnation blesses the marketplace as a space with an authority of its own, an
authority that might take the place of mystified Royal power. But Paradise Lost never makes
that argument. Indeed, the oft-noted presence in the work of a counter-narrative of Satanic
imperialism would seem to suggest the reverse, as would Milton’s most explicit statement of his
view of an ideal Republican society, The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free
Commonwealth (1660), which closes with revulsion at the “rotten” idol worship (CPW, VII, 462)
of those who would “prostitute religion and libertie to the vain and groundless apprehension, that
nothing but kingship can restore trade” (461). For all of Paradise Lost’s economic language, not
only in the Incarnation, but in the language of labor and of empire, and for all its concern with its
own historical moment, the poem, I think, refuses to affirm positively a particular economic
model for postlapsarian society. It ends, rather with Michael leaving Adam and Eve, the world
“all before them, where to choose” but also with “Providence thir guide” (XII, 646-7). Choice,
then is not the illusory “free choice” that Satan dictates from his throne in Hell (II, 19) and which
we might associate with a free market. Rather, choice emerges for the reader out of the tension
between the economies of Heaven and Hell. What those two economies reveal is that Paradise
Lost’s economic theology, far from justifying the market’s ways to men, rather reveals what the
ideology of a market economy like Shakespeare’s necessarily obscures: the idolatry by which
markets construct value.

iii: Productive and Reductive Incarnations
Blair Hoxby has recently taken up the cause of a Milton devoted until the Restoration to
the free market.24 To Hoxby, Milton’s call in Areopagitica for a free press entails “putting his

24

Blair Hoxby, Mammon’s Music: Literature and Economics in the Age of Milton. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 2002., p. 47. Hoxby argues that Milton’s faith in the market extends into The Readie and

T. Lay, p. 12

faith not in men but in a system of commerce and exchange. He puts his faith in the market”
(45). But David Hawkes has criticized Hoxby for an anachronistic assumption of the natural
authority of markets. To Hawkes, Milton’s limited support for free trade was subordinate to his
devotion to keeping religion uncommodified. Hoxby’s “enthusiasm for the market,” Hawkes
argues, “goads him into making claims that students of Milton ought to recognize as satanic:
‘the market is a means by which imperfect men may, in the long term, approximate the wisdom
of God.’”25 As an instance of Areopagitica’s subordination of economy to religion, Hawkes
cites Milton’s scorn for “a wealthy man addicted to his pleasure and to his profits”:
[F]ain he would have the name to be religious, fain he would bear up with his
neighbours in that. What does he therefore, but resolvs to give over toyling, and
to find himself out som factor, to whose care and credit he may commit the whole
managing of his religious affairs; som Divine of note and estimation that must be.
To him he adheres, resigns the whole ware-house of his religion, but with all the
locks and keyes into his custody; and indeed makes the very person of that man
his religion; esteems his associating with him a sufficient evidence and
commendatory of his own piety. So that a man may say his religion is now no
more within himself, but is becom a dividual movable, and goes and comes neer
him, according as that good man frequents the house. ... [H]is Religion walks
abroad at eight, and leavs this kind entertainer in the shop trading all day without
his religion. (CPW vol II, 444-5)
To Hoxby, this passage is a call for tradesmen to integrate religious and secular life and become
“enterprisers in all aspects of the public sphere” (45). Just what sort of integration Hoxby is
imagining is unclear; religion receives only perfunctory treatment in the chapter. To Hoxby,
integration seems to mean no more than bringing an enterprising spirit to church. But this is

Easie Way, but that by 1660, trade had become an effective Royalist argument, so that Milton hedged his bets by
inveighing against it at the essay’s close (77-90). He goes on to argue that the victory of the Royalist argument for
trade embittered Milton to the marketplace, and he reads Paradise Lost as a conservative critique of trade (150-177).
25
“The Concept of the ‘Hireling’ in Milton’s Theology,” Milton Studies, vol. 43, 2004, pp. 64-85, specifically p.
67. Hawkes here is responding to an earlier essay by Hoxby (“The Trade of Truth Advanced: Areopagitica,
Economic Discourse, and Libertarian Reform,” Milton Studies, vol. 36, 1998, pp. 117-202.) substantially
incorporated into Mammon’s Music, which Hawkes does not discuss in this essay. The passage Hawkes quotes is on
p. 188 of the earlier Hoxby essay; in Mammon’s Music, Hoxby qualified his earlier statement: “...approximate, if
never really attain, the wisdom of God” (41). See also Hawkes’ review of Mammon’s Music in TLS, 2 April 2004,
p. 10 and Hoxby’s rejoinder in TLS, 30 April 2004. (TLS fails to provide page numbers with online retrieval.)
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precisely the sort of thing Milton is decrying. Milton’s assault on religion that becomes a
“dividual movable” is a critique of tradesmen who use priests as a sort of prosthetic religion, that
is in Hawkes’ words alienated26 and “relegat[ed] to a form of property.” “Milton is appalled,”
says Hawkes, “by the idea that religion can be conceived of as a thing, an alienable commodity.”
Rather, he says, “radical Protestant[s] ... ‘understood their faith, or conscience, as a part of
themselves, and so as something which they owned absolutely and individually’” (68)27.
As a rejoinder to Hoxby’s celebration of an Areopagitica that would seem to anticipate
Adam Smith, Hawkes’ argument is, I think, substantially right. But he makes two assumptions
that, while familiar as interpretations of Protestantism, misconstrue Milton’s theology,
particularly in Paradise Lost. First, Hawkes understands commodification as a matter of valuing
things. Second, he locates Milton’s hope for non-commodified religion in the individual’s
ownership of his or her faith.28 But in Paradise Lost, to “believe / in [Christ’s] redemption” is to
have “imputed ... by faith, his merits,” by way of Christ “coming in the flesh” to redeem “the
sins / of all mankind, with him there crucifi’d” (XII, 407-8, 405, 416-7). Faith is a matter of
things – of the incarnation of flesh, and moreover, of value held in not “individually” (as we use
the term) but in common, – or, in political terms, in Common-wealth.
The modern sense of the word “individual” to signify the personal – that which cannot be
divided because it is the smallest divisible unit – dates from the seventeenth century, but Milton
26

Hawkes points out in a note that “the word ‘alienation’ boasts a pedigree that may seem surprisingly long. It
was regularly used in the seventeenth century to carry the modern sense of an illegitimate or unethical
externalization of property” (84 n13).
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Hawkes is quoting Laura Bruce, The Idea of Property in Seventeenth-Century England (Manchester, 1998), 5.
28
Hawkes repeats both of these assumptions on the next page in positing a difference “in the thought of Milton
and [some of] his contemporaries – the difference between conceiving of oneself as an integral, unitary, and
indivisible being, and the conception that imagines it is possible for one part of the self to alienate, or ‘sell,’ another.
The latter notion must inevitably imagine the part of the self that is sold as a thing, a commodity” (69). Hawkes’s
essay is specific to several prose tracts, but he posits a stability in Milton’s early declaration that “Antichrist is
Mammon’s son,” which, Hawkes writes, “deserves to be understood as a definitive statement of his iconoclastic
theology, and as a manifesto to which he remained faithful throughout his life (82). Hawkes also implies a
continuity of his argument to Paradise Lost in deeming Hoxby’s celebration of the market “satanic” (67).
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used the word in its older meaning – that which cannot be divided off because it is a part of a
whole.29 When Hawkes contrasts Milton’s “dividual movable” with Protestant individual faith,
he reverses what the word meant for Milton, so that Hawkes’s “individual” is for Milton a
“dividual movable.” Consider Milton’s use of the word “individual” in God’s pronouncement in
Book V of Paradise Lost:
Hear all ye Angels, Progenie of Light,
Thrones, Dominiations, Princedoms, Vertues, Powers,
Hear my Decree, which unrevok’t shall stand.
This day I have begot whom I declare
My onely Son, and on this holy Hill
Him have anointed, whom ye now behold
At my right hand; your Head I him appoint;
And by my Self have sworn to him shall bow
All knees in Heav’n, and shall confess him Lord:
Under his great Vice-gerent Reign abide
United as one individual Soul
For ever happie: him who disobeys
Me disobeys, breaks union, and that day
Cast out from God and blessed vision, falls
Into utter darkness, deep ingulft, his place
Ordaind without redemption, without end. (600-15)
For Milton, the “individual soul” is not the solitary person but the community. To join that
community means to disavow personal thrones and dominions to participate in a communal
redemptive economy.
Indeed, those who do abandon Heaven’s community are not the faithful, but rather the
rebel angels. Hell is a place of kingship – of Satan’s throne (II, 1), Death’s crown (II, 673), and
Molloch’s Kingly name (I, 392 and II, 43)30 – because it is, again and again, distinguished by an
inward turn. For Satan to declare “the mind ... its own place” (I, 254) and go off alone so that so
that “none shall partake” in his personal glory (II, 465-6), has tempted many subsequent readers

29

My discussion of the meaning of “individual” derives both from the OED and from comments in class by Peter
Stallybrass. The paraphrases I give are of OED definitions 1 and 3 respectively.
30
Both instances refer to him as a king because Molloch is Hebrew for “king.”
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to his side. Later readers of Milton have also tended to enjoy Satan’s soliloquies more than
God’s dreary colloquies. But for Satan, the price of that solitude is that he
like a devillish Engine back recoils
Upon himself; horror and doubt distract
His troubl’d thoughts, and from the bottom stirr
The Hell within him, for within him Hell
He brings, and round about him, nor from Hell
One step no more then from himself can fly
By change of place. (IV, 18-23)
Satan’s first grand soliloquy in Book IV, arises out of “despair” (23, 74, 114, 156) at being cast
out of Heaven’s economy for
Warring in Heav’n against Heavn’s matchless King:
Ah wherefore! he deserv’d no such return
From me, whom he created what I was
In that bright eminence, and with his good
Upbraided none; nor was his service hard.
What could be less then to afford him praise
The easiest recompence, and pay him thanks,
How due! yet all his good prov’d ill in me,
And wrought but malice; lifted up so high
I sdeined subjection, and thought one step higher
Would set me highest, and in a moment quit
The debt immense of endless gratitude
So burthensome still paying, still to ow;
Forgetful what from him I still receiv’d
And understood not that a grateful mind
By owing owes not, but still pays, at once
Indebted and discharg’d. (41-57)
If in soliloquy, Satan can recognize his error, he cannot by soliloquy rectify it. “Which way I flie
is Hell; my self am Hell,” he discovers (75). Divorced from Heaven’s ever-fluid economy of
debt that paradoxically sustains through owing, Satan has only himself left. “All good to me is
lost; / Evil be thou my Good,” he declares and embraces evil to colonize an alien space and gain
“at least / Divided Empire with Heav’ns King” in “this new World” (109-13).
As Satan’s soliloquy frames his alienation from Heaven in terms of a pair of economies –
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Heaven’s “debt immense of endless gratitude” and his own imperial ambitions – it would be well
here to return to the other problematic aspect of Hawkes’s reading of Milton’s scorn for
commerce that would alienate religion. To Hawkes, “Milton is appalled by the idea that religion
can be conceived of as a thing, an alienable commodity. He is angered by the prospect of a
properly subjective experience being given objective form” (68). But the greatest subject of
Paradise Lost is Satan, literally “thrown under”31 – and thrown under because he is “selftempted, self-depraved” (II, 130), alienated because he quits the heavenly economy and turns
instead to the mind as “its own place.” The greatest object, on the other hand is the Son, whose
flesh pays for the debts of the whole human race. The problem here is a consequence of
Hawkes’s identification of commodities with things, in what Jones and Stallybrass consider a
misreading of Marx:
Marx’s critique of capitalism is not a critique of “materialism.” Marx, of course,
famously developed a theory of fetishism, but it was a theory of fetishism of the
commodity, not of the object. For Marx, the commodity comes to life through the
death of the object. What defines a commodity always lies outside any specific
object, and depends upon the equating of a specific quantity of paper cups with a
specific quantity of coal or diamonds or academic books.32
By understanding Milton’s reservations about commerce as the result of a concern with things,
Hawkes elides the distinction that is at the center of Paradise Lost: the conflict between a
heavenly economy that properly values things and a hellish commercial economy bent on
31

The word’s etymological meaning, as Stallybrass reminds us (“Value of Culture,” 175), citing Althuser.
Indeed , the last instance of the word in Paradise Lost, “the subjected plain” (XII, 640) requires a literal translation
of the Latin. The OED’s first instance of the modern sense (def. 9) dates from 1796, with transitional instances
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collection Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture, ed., de Grazia, Quilligan, and Stallybrass. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995. However the only prior attempts that I am aware of to understand subjects and
objects and commodities and things in the terms outlined in that volume are Maureen Quilligan’s contribution
therein (“Freedom, Service, and the Trade in Slaves: The Problem of Labor in Paradise Lost,” pp. 213-29), which
relates the work’s treatment of labor to contemporary discourses of slavery, and Jones and Stallybrass’s brief
discussion of the passage in Book X in which The Son clothes Adam and Eve (209-23), which they read as a form of
livery (20-21).
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overprizing things – apples, for instance – and selling them as commodities to people who don’t
need them.
Let’s go back to the economy of debt in Book III. From our sense of religion, it is odd to
think of the Incarnation as economic, but the converse is also true: from the standpoint of
modern capitalism, it’s odd to think of an economy based on flesh. Man’s debt is redeemed by
the Son’s body, “Made flesh” (284), and it is only by being a part of an economy of living things
– an economy in which value is inherent rather than representational – that the Son manages
what sounds to us like an impossible deal, in which he pays the debt and yet reascends, bringing
mankind with him. God redeems man’s debt by “joyn[ing]” mankind’s “Nature” to the Son’s
(282), without “less’n[ing] or degrad[ing] [his] own” (304), and the language here turns
horticultural: the Son, born by “Virgin seed” (284), restores man “As from a second root” (288)
to “live in [the Son] transplanted, and from [him] / Receive new life” (293-4). From our
perspective, to pay a debt means losing that which you pay, but a debt based on living things can
be productive in its own right. What Satan has failed to understand is that Heaven’s debt is a
productive debt of “endless gratitude,” in which “a grateful mind / By owing owes not, but still
pays, at once / Indebted and discharg’d” (IV, 52, 55-7). Satan has conceived of debt as we
conceive of it – as something to be paid off. But Heaven’s debt is one of mutual benefit to all
who partake, so that in paying, one “still receiv[es]” (IV, 53).
Whereas Heaven’s economy places value in living things without an intermediate symbol
of currency, Hell’s economy takes inanimate things and ascribes to them a value beyond what
inheres in them. The first thing the fallen angels do in Book I to build a home in Hell is to seek
out gold, not for its physical properties but because of its apparently inherent value:
Mammon led them on,
Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell
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From heav’n, for ev’n in heav’n his looks and thoughts
Were always downward bent, admiring more
The riches of Heavn’s pavement, trod’n Gold
Then aught divine or holy else enjoy’d
In vision beatific: by him first
Men also, and by his suggestion taught
Ransack’d the Center, and with impious hands
Rifl’d the bowels of thir mother Earth
For Treasures better hid. Soon had his crew
Op’nd into the Hill a spacious wound
And dig’d out ribs of Gold. Let none admire
That riches grow in Hell; that soyl may best
Deserve the precious bane. (I, 678-92)
What this passage makes clear is gold is not a “bane” in and of itself; if it were, it could hardly
pave the floor of Heaven. It only becomes a bane socially by being understood as “riches.” The
problem with gold for the rebel angels is that Mammon (literally, “wealth”33) imputes a value to
it beyond its use as a floor, and by gazing only downward alienates himself from a heavenly
economy that uses gold not as a symbolic form of value, but as something to tread upon. In
doing so, he encourages men to destroy the organic earth that might fertilize crops in favor of a
metal that, when they treat it as precious, poisons rather than sustains them. The problem of
sustenance reappears in Mammon’s speech in Book II, in which, having left Heaven’s economy
of “worship paid” (248), he calls on the rebel angels to “rather seek / Our own good from our
selves, and from our own / Live to our selves, though in this vast recess, / Free, and to none
accountable” (252-5). The problem is that in Paradise Lost, to turn within the self is insufficient
for sustenance. Value comes from flesh shared socially; one only attains it by being
“accountable.” Thus Mammon inevitably turns outside himself, and not to community, but
rather to “hidden lustre, Gemms and Gold ... from whence to raise / Magnificence” (271-3). In
the economy of Hell, the inward turn is insufficient to provide sustenance, and so the rebel
angels turn outward to seek value elsewhere.
33
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For Satan, the outward turn is a turn to colonize. Many critics have noted that Satan’s
voyage is represented as a colonial voyage to a “new world” (I, 650; II, 403, 867; IV, 34, 113,
391; X, 257, 377). David Quint has called attention to the commercial aspect of Satan’s voyage,
particularly in Book II. Quint cites the comparison of Satan to a merchant bringing spices from
the Indies (636-43), and argues that “the passage retrospectively lends a mercantile note to
Beelzebub’s earlier talk of ‘enterprise’ (345) and ‘some advantageous act’ (363), and it colors
the exchange between Satan and Chaos about ‘recompense’ (981), ‘advantage’ (987), and ‘gain’
(1009).”34 I would go further to argue that the roots of Satan’s mission in “covert guile” rather
than “open Warr” (II, 41) necessarily emphasizes the commercial aspects of empire. His object
is to lure Adam and Eve away from God, which he accomplishes by convincing them to misprize
an apple.
Yet for all Satan’s success in colonizing a new world, his economy of inwardness
ultimately proves reductive. In Book IX, Satan had decided that he needed a subjective form
other than himself to win his prize, and so he sought to take the form of the serpent, declaring,
O foul descent! that I who erst contended
With Gods to sit the highest, am now constraind
Into a Beast, and mixt with bestial slime
This essence to incarnate and imbrute,
That to the hight of Deity aspir’d;
But what will not Ambition and Revenge
Descend to? who aspires must down as low
34

David Quint, Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993, pp. 265. Quint argues that Milton deflates Satan by turning what ought to be heroic
adventures into mercantile adventures, with the result that the work “cannot be accommodated to epic terms, for epic
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perspective, arguing that as an epic written by a loser, Paradise Lost turns away from the imperial implications of
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God allows to human dominion. (See “Paradise Lost and the Colonial Imperative, ” Milton Studies, vol. 34, 1996,
pp. 3-21. Hoxby’s chapter on Paradise Lost argues that Paradise Lost is a conservative reaction to the Royalist
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arguing that Adam and Eve’s descent into the world moves them into the historical realm of economics and out of
the Edenic “logic of loss and redemption” (176). Hoxby apparently does not notice that Paradise Lost’s “logic of
loss and redemption” is economic.
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As high he soard, obnoxious first or last
To basest things. (163-71)
Satan’s own self-exchangability is a means of advancement in an economy in which “spite ...
with spite is best repaid” (177). In returning to Hell in Book X, he celebrates his new “enmity”
(486) with mankind, and boasts of what he deems a triumphant exchange he has gained by it:
I am to bruise his heel;
His seed, when is not set, shall bruise my head:
A World who would not purchase with a bruise,
Or much more grievous pain? Ye have th’account
Of my performance: What remains, ye Gods,
But up and enter now into full bliss. (X, 498-503)
But for Satan to have “purchased” something in an economy of spite means the opposite of being
able to participate in it: to purchase a world is to reduce it to an item of exchange. Moreover, he
has purchased it by exchanging himself for the serpent. At the time, Satan had judged the
exchange a profitable investment, but in Hell, he discovers the reciprocity inherent in an
economy of competitive exchange. Now, at the instant he proclaims his success, he is greeted
not with a “universal shout” (505), but with “a dismal universal hiss” (508). The act of
purchasing mankind in an economy of animosity has reduced the rebel angels to the basest level
of their own exchangability: they become serpents. Even the narrative “account” in which Satan
takes so much pride signals the end of articulate speech. “Th’ account / of [his] performance”
becomes not a narrative account but an economic account that, because it is based on competitive
exchange can only spiral downward. By repaying “spite ... with spite,” Satan finds himself in an
economy that returns only “hiss for hiss” (518) – the opposite of Heaven’s economy of “life for
life” (III, 236).
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iv: The Solitary Plural
Twice in Paradise Lost, Adam and Eve are described in terms that modern editions
usually render “the only two of mankind” (III, 65; IX, 415). A third time, they are “two only”
(V, 366). In modern spelling, the epithet reduces them to a definite and insignificant number.
But Milton’s spelling - “onely” makes visible the word’s derivation: one-ly. To be two one-ly is
not reductive but paradoxical.35

In book IX, Adam and Eve are “The onely two of Mankind,

but in them / The whole included Race” (415-6). They are two-in-one in the sense that the trinity
is three-in-one, and they share an “individual” soul like Heaven’s. When Adam first sees Eve
and she flees, he calls after her,
Whom fli’st thou? whom thou fli’st, of him thou art,
His flesh, his bone; to give thee being I lent
Out of my side to thee, neerest my heart
Substantial Life, to have thee by my side
Henceforth an individual solace dear;
Part of my Soul I seek thee, and thee claim
My other half. (IV, 482-8)
For all the problems of the work’s treatment of gender roles, even in Eve’s genesis from Adam,
the work’s rhetoric, at first and at the end is the rhetoric of mutual and equal society between
Adam and Eve.
One of the more problematic aspects of the work’s treatment of gender difference is that
Book IX makes the fall consequent to a discussion some two hundred lines long in which Eve
persuades Adam to divide their labor. On Satan, “Occasion ... smiles” when he “behold[s] alone
/ The Woman, opportune to all attempts” (480-01). The narrative of Book IX is from union to
division to a brief but crucial reunion that produces Adam’s fall and then back to “variance and
accusation of one another” (IX, Argument). Book X, on the other hand, moves from soliloquy
back to union. Soliloquy, I have suggested, is Satan’s mode. Its subjective sublimity in book IV
35
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moves Satan to the point of despair – the word appears four times in that passage – and it entails
a reductive economy. For Adam, it takes an altered version of the latter characteristic: though
its economy does not collapse as far as Satan’s, it is nevertheless haunted by the horror of
existing finite. Whereas Eve will despair and suggest she and Adam “seek Death, or he not
found, supply / With our own hands his Office on our selves” (1001-2), Adam rather bewails that
death has not come and that he must produce infinite unhappy progeny from himself:
yet well, if I would here end
The miserie, I deserv’d it, and would bear
My own deservings; but this will not serve;
All that I eat or drink, or shall beget,
Is propegated curse. O voice once heard
Delightfully, Encrease and multipliy,
Now death to hear! for what can I encrease
Or multiplie, but curses on my head? (725-32, italics sic)
Adam no longer enjoys Heaven’s All nor is he become death’s None. He may not “resigne, and
render back / All [he] receav’d, unable to perform / [God’s] terms too hard” (749-51). His curse
is to exist materially and be forced to spend of himself to pay back a God who might
draw out
For angers sake, finite to infinite
In punisht man to satisfie his rigour
Satisfi’d never. (801-4)
In soliloquy, Adam’s economy becomes as limited as Satan’s was: “in [him] all / Posteritie
stands curst,” (817-8), and posterity “Shall with a fierce relux on [him] redound” (738), just as
Satan, in soliloquy “like a devillish Engine back recoils / Upon himself” (IV, 17-18).
And yet, Adam’s mortality brings with it the possibility of redemption, for to “satisfie
[God’s] rigour / Satisfi’d never” is to enter into Heaven’s economy of a “debt immense of
endless gratitude, / … still paying, still to ow” (III, 52-3). Whereas in soliloquy, Satan could
only recognize this, Adam can, in union with Eve, effect it. Whereas Satan had turned from
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soliloquy to others only in enmity, the human two now turn to each other in “Commiseration”
(940) to seek “reconcilement” (443) of Eve’s suicidal despair and Adam’s existential anguish.
Eve, through “love sincere” (914) teaches Adam to “strive / in offices of Love, how we may
light’n / Each others burden in our share of woe” (959-61), and Adam teaches Eve to shun the
“self-destruction” that “refutes” the “excellence” she possesses (1016-7). Although their roles
are differentiated by gender (Adam surely takes more of the initiative in determining their plans
at the book’s end), there is, I think, a very real suggestion that their survival depends upon
mutual responsiveness to each other’s concerns. In cooperation, they learn to embrace their
curse of labor, and by it to earn things that possess real value. By reconciliation with Eve, Adam
reconsiders what is left to them:
to thee
Pains onely in Child-bearing were foretold
And bringing forth, soon recompenc’t with joy,
Fruit of thy womb: On me the Curse aslope
Glanc’d on the ground, with labour I must earn
My bread; what harm? Idleness had bin worse;
My labour will sustain me. (1050-6)
The opening of Book IX had suggested the ideas both that without labor, “th’ hour of Supper”
might come “unearn’d” (225) and that “younger hands” might “assist” them (246-7), but in
Paradise, both ideas lacked urgency; there, they sound more like problems devised for the sake
of having something to solve. But in union after their lapse, Adam and Eve learn sincerity, and
can offer to God “sorrow unfeign’d and humiliation meek” (X, 1004).
Book XI begins by complicating but not reversing Book X’s story of human
reconcilement. In the opening lines, we learn that their agency was enabled by “Prevenient
Grace” – the Son’s atonement already implicit36 – which “descending had remov’d / The stonie
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and conversion, predisposing the heart to seek God, previously to any desire or motion on the part of the recipient.”
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from thir hearts and made new flesh / Regenerat grow instead” (3-5). The notion of “Prevenient
Grace” does not negate choice but rather gives choice meaning. With stony hearts, Adam and
Eve stood no better chance of choosing repentance than Satan with “fixt mind” (I, 97). On the
other hand, they must be left to make their choice. As God asks in Book III,
Not free, what proof could they have givn sincere
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,
Where onely what they needs must do, appeard,
Not what they would? what praise could they receive?
What pleasure I from such obedience paid
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoild,
Made passive both, had serv’d necessitie,
Not mee. (103-12)
It is in flesh – the flesh both of the Son’s atonement and of their own hearts – that Adam and Eve
can learn to value rightly and make the right choices. In the same way that choosing rightly only
matters when one can choose wrongly, one can only learn to value things rightly by being flesh,
having to labor, and being susceptible to scarcity. There are political implications as well:
“freedom” becomes a prerequisite for correctly determining value; “necessitie” – “The Tyrants
plea” in Book IV (394) – voids choices of their worth.
Paradise Lost ends with choice: “The world was all before them where to choose / Thir
place of rest” (XII, 646-7). If the last three books offered a course of training in how to choose,
they have not made particular choices easy. Book XII offers a litany of answers that it
subsequently complicates. First, Adam mistakenly assumes that the Son will descend and win
the world in decisive battle (375ff). Then there is the suggestion of the fortunate fall (469ff) –
perhaps ultimately true, but in the meanwhile there are the “enemies of truth” (482) to be dealt

One tends to forget that Book III transpires before the fall because of its dizzying negotiation of tenses by which it
“comprises the entire history of mankind in an enormous abridgment” (as another materialist has theorized
messianic time that can “blast open the continuum of history.” See Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of
History,” Illuminations, ed., Hannah Arendt, trans., Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1968, pp. 262-3.)
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with. Finally, at the moment the work seems to be suggesting a turn toward “inward
consolations” (495) and to a solitary walk with God (561ff), Michael declares that Adam has
“attaind the sum / Of wisdom” (575-6) and, in parting tells Adam to
onely add
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add Faith
Add Vertue, Patience, Temperance, add Love
By name to come call’d Charitie, the soul
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loath
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess
A Paradise within thee, happier farr. (581-7)
It is an extraordinarily ambitious litany of things to “onely add,” but Adam and Eve are denied
the specious ease sought by their tempter. Whereas Satan, by consuming the inward, has to turn
destructively outward, Adam and Eve may only attain inward happiness through difficult,
productive outward works.
Unlike Heaven and Hell, Earth does not enter Paradise Lost with a ready-made economy;
the point of the work is to create one, first under Heaven’s influence, then by Hell’s meddling,
and finally by the human effort of learning how to negotiate the world while separate from
Heaven but guided by it. But the creation of the earth in Book VII offers a clue for how a
worldly economy might work. There,
First crept
The Parsimonious Emmet, provident
Of future, in small room large heart enclos’d,
Pattern of just equalitie perhaps
Hereafter, join’d in her popular Tribes
Of Commonaltie. (484-9)
The republican rhetoric of commonwealth is clear enough, but the passage does not only
celebrate “just equalitie” of rank; equality is also a matter of material needs. Heaven seems to
produce ample bounty and those in Hell pretend to have a limitless bounty within themselves,
but Earth faces the possibility of scarcity. The ant’s sense of “Commonaltie” is predicated on its
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sense of parsimony (frugality, thrift37) and providence for the future. Equality then is not just a
matter of doing away with kings; it requires shared work and shared enjoyment of the fruits of
that work, just as the Son’s redemption saves “the whole Race lost” (III, 280) and Heaven’s
bounty is the result of being “one individual Soul.” If in Eden, Adam and Eve were “two onely,” the final gesture of the poem is to restore the paradox of the singular plural. As Michael
leads them out of Eden, he rejoins the hands that had parted before the fall (IX, 385), and it is
“hand in hand” (648) that they take, in the poem’s paradoxical last three words, “thir solitarie
way.”

v: Religion and Politics
To Marx’s comment about a Protestant, and particularly Scottish, theology of credit, with
which I began, I would like to add one point that perhaps complicates the history that Marx
suggested and that Parker has elaborated. Unlike the Church of England, Presbyterianism
rendered he Lord’s Prayer’s fifth petition accurately as “forgive us our debts as we forgive our
debters.” Although in theory more radical than Anglicanism in the its critique of materialist
religion, the Presbyterian Church left in one of its central texts an economy of belief unfamiliar
to the majority of English-speaking Protestants. As a child from a long-time Methodist family, I
dutifully learned the Lord’s prayer in the Anglican rendering of “tresspasses” that Methodism
had retained. But when I was eleven, my family moved to Longview, Texas, where, dissatisfied
with the conservatism of the local Methodist Churches, we joined the city’s two or three dozen
other liberal Protestants at a Presbyterian Church. We only stayed in Longview for a year, but it
was the year when I was the age for Presbyterian confirmation classes with the minister, an aging
Southerner of Scottish descent, who my father was particularly happy to discover was an old
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New Dealer in a city turning rapidly Republican. As a new Presbyterian, my most pressing
question for him was why everybody said “forgive us our debts” during the service. He replied
that the standing joke in seminary was that the Presbyterians version was the legacy of
impoverished Scots who preferred to have their debts forgiven.
If my anecdote sounds incidental to a history of Christianity in which Luther and Calvin
represent a turn away from economic theology and socially valued works, and toward salvation
in faith alone through the individual’s unmediated access to God, then consider Milton’s position
in that history. Milton’s economy of redemption, his celebration of flesh, his insistence on
Christianity as a social bond that requires works: all these smack not of Puritanism but of
Catholicism. Although the condemnation of idolatry was usually a Protestant concern, Milton’s
condemnation fits more comfortably within the self-criticism that Catholicism traditionally
allowed (one thinks, for instance, of Chaucer’s “Pardoner’s Tale”) than in a Protestant ideology
that denies real value to anything material. My point, of course, is not to argue that Milton was
really a Catholic - some of these points make at least as much sense if one thinks of him as an
Arminian. Rather I am attempting to complicate a narrative of Early Modern theology often told
as a history of two or three party lines, proliferating, perhaps into a dozens or so more in the
seventeenth century. Such a narrative is useful in telling a history of theological debate that very
often did, I think, depend upon building official theologies and differentiating one’s own party
from the heresies that rivals exposed when they differentiated their theology from that of their
rivals. Official constructions of the sort surely do become powerful in a Christian society that, at
least in theory, requires everyone to take sides. But I wonder how strongly these rigidly
differentiated theologies determined ideology, particularly in the wake of the radical political
upheaval of the English Revolution. Milton’s own idiosyncratic theology, I would suggest, was

T. Lay, p. 28

grounded as much in a radical political critique as it was in traditional theological arguments –
indeed that for Milton, to do otherwise would have been to treat religion as a “dividual
movable.” For Milton, a materialist theology entailed a concern for the social relationships
present in the world. From the perspective of a modern atheist (my own, as it happens), to posit
a god is to mystify material conditions, but, taken on its own assumption of a material Christ,
Paradise Lost exposes earthly hierarchies and insists instead both on equality both of rank and of
material means.
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